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INTRODUCTION
Although replete with vituperative rhetoric, the Brief of Appellee Gayle Ball ("Ball") is
devoid of analysis or legal authority to refute the numerous instances of error identified by
Appellant David Peterson ("Peterson"). In response to every issue raised by Peterson, Ball
relies on the "broad discretion" of the trial court in dealing with matters of child support. While
Peterson clearly recognizes that trial courts are vested with substantial discretion in dealing with
domestic litigation, many of the issues in this appeal involve the trial court's interpretation and
application of statutory provisions. These issues are questions of law, which are reviewed for
correctness. Even as to those issues committed to the discretion of the trial court, by findings
sufficient to permit this court to determine whether the trial court's action was rationally based.
As to both the legal and factual issues identified in Peterson's opening brief, Ball has completely
failed to provide support for the trial court's actions challenged through this appeal.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court must be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred in retroactively modifying Peterson's child support obligations
for periods prior to the filing of Ball's petition for modification, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2).
Ball has conceded, as she must, that Utah law flatly proscribes retroactive modification

of child support obligations. See Appellee's Brief at 11. Indeed, section 30-3-10.6(2) of the
Utah Code Ann. and numerous decisions of this court have established that "[i]n no event may
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the award be retroactively increased beyond the period during which the modification petition
was pending." Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1994); accord Cummings v.
Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 480-81 (Utah App. 1991). It is readily apparent from the face of the
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, however, that a substantial part of
Peterson's alleged child support arrearages are based on a retroactive application of the
modification sought through Ball's Counterpetition to Modify, which was not filed until
December 1993.
It is undisputed that Ball's Counter-Petition was not filed until the end of December 1993.
It is also undisputed that the then existing child support order was entered in February 1992.
Under the February 1992 support order, Peterson was obligated to pay $1547.00 per month.
This amount represents Peterson's child support obligation, at least until the filing of Ball's
Counterpetition in December 1993. As reflected in the trial courts's Findings and Conclusions,
however, Peterson has been assessed "arrearages" for the months from June 1992 through July
1993 because he was not paying Ball $1745.00 per month. Peterson's child support obligation
was not $1745.00 during 1992 or 1993. No petition to modify was filed No order modifying
his child support obligation had been entered.
Ball implicitly concedes this point in her brief when she explains that these purported
arrearages were derived from "amounts [that] were changed . . . pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.10 which provides for an automatic change without the need for an Order to Show
Cause or Petition to Modify . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 11. In other words there was no
petition to modify or other request for judicial modification of Peterson's support obligation.
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Apparently Ball contends Peterson was simply supposed to know that his support obligation had
been "automatically" increased by an event that occurred almost immediately after the
determination of his support obligation in February 1992.l
At the time the February 1992 Order was entered, there were four minor children living
with Ball and the oldest minor child, Cameron, was living with Peterson. The court ordered
child support of $1547 based on this custody arrangement. Less than a month later, Cameron
attained age 18. He continued to live with Peterson and the four remaining minor children
continued to live with Ball. Because the number of minor children living with Ball had not
changed, Peterson continued to pay the ordered support of $1547.00 per month throughout this
period from June 1992 (when Cameron Peterson had attained majority and graduated from high
school) through August of 1993 (when Cynthia Peterson moved into Peterson's home). The
"arrearages" assessed by the trial court are clearly predicated on the assumption that Peterson
should have been paying $1745 per month during this time. Such a determination represents an
improper retroactive modification of support obligation for periods prior to the filing of Ball's
Counterpetition, which did not occur until December 1993.

'As set forth more fully below, Ball contends that the $1547 per month award established
by the February 1992 order should have "automatically" increased pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-45-7.10, in March 1992 when the parties' oldest child, Cameron, who was living with
Peterson, attained majority and converted a 4-1 split custody scenario into situation in which
there were only 4 minor children - all living with Ball. Peterson contends this is an erroneous
application of that statute. See discussion at 7-13 below. For purposes of the "retroactivity"
issue, however, it must be noted that Ball did not even raise the argument that Peterson should
have paid $1745 per month until January 31. 1994, when she filed an Affidavit in Support of
her Counterpetition to Modify [R. at 760].
p\59630-1.013.chd
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Ball asserts, without citation of either legal or factual support, that the trial court's
assessment of "arrearages" with respect to amounts Peterson had never been ordered to pay was
within its "broad discretion." See Appellee's Brief at 12. A trial court's discretion, however,
does not entitle it to ignore controlling statutes and established case law. Indeed, Ball's own
brief concedes that the appropriate standard of review with respect to the trial court's apparent
retroactive increase of Peterson's support obligations is a "correctness" standard. See Appellee's
Brief at 1. The unequivocal language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2) and established case
law interpreting it, unquestionably preclude retroactive modifications of support obligations and
that portion of the district court's award must be reversed.
II.

The trial court erred in retroactively applying the 1994 amendments to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7 et seq., which require child support payments to continue until
children graduate from high school, to modify Peterson's child support obligations
and to assess arrearages based on Peterson's non-compliance with statutes that were
not yet in effect, with respect to Peterson's children Cameron2 and Patrice and,
both of whom had attained majority prior to the enactment of the 1994
amendments.
The parties' original Decree of Decree of Divorce stated that Peterson's child support

obligation would continue "until each child reaches the age of 18 years, or becomes
emancipated, whichever shall first occur." [R. at 272]. The February 25, 1992 Order modifying

2

Peterson's Opening Brief incorrectly refers to Cynthia Peterson in the statement of this issue
as one of the parties' children who attained age 18 prior to July 1, 1994. The text of the brief
correctly identifies Cameron and Patrice as the two children two whom this issue relates.
Moreover, Peterson concedes now, as he did in his opening brief, see Appellant's Brief at 18
& n. 5, that the district court's error as to the time Cameron attained majority worked in his
favor. Ball's allegations that Peterson has "unclean hands" because he raises "retroactivity"
issues only when they are in his favor, see Appellee's Brief at 14, are unfounded.
p\59630-1.013.chd
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the Decree did not alter or extend the time for which Peterson was responsible for making child
support payments. [R. at 726-29]. A portion of the arrearages assessed against Peterson,
however, are based on the assumption that Peterson's support obligation continued until each
child reached 18 and graduated from high school. This represents a retroactive application of
amendments to § 78-45-7.10 which were effective as of July 1, 1994. That amendment has the
effect of extending the period of time for which child support is owed when a child reaches the
age of 18 before he or she graduates from high school. Both Cameron Peterson and Patrice
Peterson reached 18 before July 1, 1994. It is therefore improper to assess arrearages with
respect to these children on the basis of a retroactive application of this substantive change in
child support law.
Ball does not dispute that the district court assessed arrearages based on the assumption
that Peterson's support obligation should have continued until the Cameron and Patrice graduated
from high school. See Appellee's Brief at 12-13. Instead, Ball argues that this Court's decision
in Thornblad v. Thornblad. 849 P.2d 1197 (Utah App. 1993), grants district courts discretion
to extend support obligations until graduation. Ball misses the point entirely. Without question
Thornblad holds that a court may exercise its discretion to extend child support obligations. In
order to do this, however, Thornblad requires that the court make specific "findings of necessity
and special circumstances to justify extending [the child's ] support obligation until graduation."
849 P.2d at 1199. The district court in Thornblad made such findings of changed circumstances,
which were upheld on appeal as warranting the extension of the support obligation.
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Equally without question is the discussion in Thomblad as to the impropriety of
"retroactively" modifying support obligations until the child graduates. Addressing this issue,
the Court of Appeals stated:
However, the trial court incorrectly applied the modification retroactively to
October 1. 1990. the date Mr. Thornblad ceased support payments for
Christopher. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2) (1992) establishes that
[al child or spousal support payment under a child support order
may be modified with respect to any period during which a petition
for modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that
petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or
to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
Notice of Mrs. Thornblad's petition for modification was served on Mr.
Thornblad on February 11, 1991. The order of modification can only be applied
retroactively to that date. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the support
obligation applicable from October 4, 1990, to February 11, 1991.
Id, at 1200 (emphasis added).
Peterson does not dispute that the district court has the discretionary power to extend
child support obligations until the time the parties' children graduated. In the present case,
however, no such discretion was exercised. No findings of changed circumstances or special
necessity were made. Instead the court simply repeated the language from the post-July 1, 1994
version of § 78-45-7.10. See Findings at K3 [R. at 1122-23]. The district court's calculation of
arrearages mistakenly assumes that, as a matter of law, Peterson's support obligation for each
child continues until the child reaches 18 and graduates from high school. With respect to
Cameron and Patrice, both of whom had reached 18 prior to the effective date (or enactment)
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of the 1994 amendments to section 7.10, the retroactive application of the substantive change
in the guidelines is improper and must be reversed.
III.

The trial court erred in interpreting § 78-45-7.10 of the Utah Code Ann. to require
an "automatic" increase in Peterson's child support obligation when Cameron, the
child living with Peterson and establishing "split" custody, attained majority, given
that the number of minor residing with Ball remained unchanged.
The legal effect of Cameron Peterson's attaining majority raises a further issue of

statutory interpretation and application. As with the issues discussed above, Ball again attempts
to hide the district court's legal error under the cloak of "discretion." See Appellee's Brief at
14-15. The February 1992 Order, which established Peterson's child support obligation through
the modification at issue in this appeal, states:
1.
Child support in the amount of $1547.00 per month is awarded
pursuant to the statutory child support guidelines for split custody, there being
four children with plaintiff, and one child with defendant, said award
commencing with November 1, 1991.
[R. at 729]. Neither the February 1992 Order nor the supporting Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law made by the district court at that time contain any statement as to the effect
upon Peterson's child support obligation of Cameron's reaching the age of 18. Less than a
month later, on March 13, 1992, Cameron Peterson turned 18.
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Utah's statutory scheme for child support includes a specific provision dealing with the
effect of children reaching majority. Section 78-45-7.10 of the Utah Code Ann., which is entitled
"Reduction when child becomes 18." (emphasis added) states3:
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, the base combined child
support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined
child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of
children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support
order.
(emphasis added). Although this statute is entitle "Reduction when child becomes 18" and the
express language of the statute refers to awards being "automatically reduced," the district court
awarded arrearages against Peterson based upon an "automatic" recalculation and increase in
Peterson's support obligation when Cameron Peterson reached majority and the 4-1 "split"
custody was replaced by 4-0 "sole" custody calculation. It is upon this basis that Ball claims
Peterson should have paid as much as $1745.00 per month even though no support order ever
required him to pay more than $1547.00 per month.
Without any case authority, legislative history or other apparent basis, Ball purports to
know the legislature's intent. According to Ball, § 78-45-7.10 is intended "to provide for the
automatic support adjustment without the expense and hassle of a court proceeding." Appellee's
Brief at 14. The plain language of the statute, however, does not support Ball's interpretation.
The statute states that child support awards should be "reduced to reflect the lower base

3

As noted above, this statute was amended effective July 1, 1994 to extend the event
triggering reduction under this statute until the child graduates from high school. The statutory
text quoted here is the language of the statute as it read in March 1992, when Cameron Peterson
attained the age of 18.
p\59630-l 013 chd
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combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of children
due child support . . . ." (emphasis added).
At the time of the February 1992 Order, Peterson was supporting four of his minor
children in Ball's household and paying $1547.00 per month. Because the remaining number
of children due child support (i.e. the children living with Ball) remained unchanged after
Cameron Peterson reached majority, Peterson properly believed that his child support obligation
remained unchanged.
The $1547.00 per month support figure was established by an Order dated February 25,
1992. Within three weeks of that Order, Cameron reached his eighteenth birthday. It is
apparent that neither the parties nor the district court believed that the support award contained
in the February Order would be superseded within such a short period of time. The fact that
Ball failed to seek the increased support of nearly $200 per month until two years later is
compelling evidence that she did not interpret the February 1992 Order to require such increased
payments. It is inequitable an unjust for Ball to advance an argument for the first time after
thousands of dollars in supposed "arrearages" had accrued.
Ball accuses Peterson's counsel "of playing semantics . . . in bad faith" on this issue.
Appellee's Brief at 15. This attack not only on Peterson but on the counsel representing him
is unwarranted and offensive.

It is incomprehensible how Ball can claim that Peterson's

argument regarding § 78-45-7.10 is not made in good faith. Peterson's argument is based on
the plain language of the statute! A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation in Utah is that
courts must look first to the plain language of the statute. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d
p\59630-1.013.chd
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623, 627 (Utah 1994); State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of
N. America. 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Harmon v. Ogden City. 258 Ut. Adv. Rptr. 5,
(Ut. App. Feb. 9, 1995). Moreover, courts are required "to assume that each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Indus, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d
664, 670 (Utah 1991).
Ball asserts that "[s]urely Peterson's counsel can see that the legislature would never have
intended" § 78-45-7.10 to be read literally and limited to the plain meaning of their terms.
Appellee's Brief at 15. This assertion falls flat in the face of the recent pronouncement from
the Utah Supreme Court that:
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive
terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be
based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to
conform to an intention not expressed.
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Ball makes
no effort to analyze the language of the statute. Instead, she simply asserts, without citation to
any authority, that her interpretation is "clearly the intent of the legislature." Appellee's Brief
at 14. The Utah Supreme Court has held, however, that "if the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent." Brinkerhoff
v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); accord World Peace Movement of Am. v.
Newspaper Agency Corp.. 879 P.2d 253, 359 (Utah 1994) ("Only when we find ambiguity in
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the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations.")
Notwithstanding Ball's ad hominem attacks on Peterson (and Peterson's counsel), nothing
in § 78-45-7.10 supports the conclusion that a child support obligation can be "automatically"
increased, without notice to the paying party or any court action, when a child of the payor
attains majority. The argument that a change in circumstances of the parties should give rise
to a later claim for child support arrearages was firmly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985). In that case, the parties agreed that one of the
parties' children would move from the custodial parent's home to the home of the non-custodial
parent. The parties stipulated to a modification of custody but did not modify the child support
order until approximately a year later. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rejection
of a claim that the change in custody gave rise to an automatic change in the child support
award. The Supreme Court explained: "Thus, while custody had changed, the order regarding
support payments had not and was a valid existing order until March 1983." Id. at 702
(emphasis added).
There are innumerable potential changes of circumstance that can bring about a
modification of a child support award. Section 78-45-7.10, by its own terms, deals with only
one. Where a child for whom a support payor is making support payment attains majority (and,
after July 1, 1994 graduates from high school), this statute indicates that the obligor's payments
are automatically reduced to the level appropriate for the "remaining number of children due
support." For other changes in circumstance, such as moving from one parent's home to the
p\59630-l 013 chd
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other (as seen in Stettler) or where the child attaining majority is not a child for whom the
support obligor is making support payments (as in the present case) and for the myriad of other
potential changes in circumstance that will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, § 78-457.10 simply does not effect an "automatic" modification of child support obligations.
Accordingly, there was no basis in the present case for the trial court to retroactively modify
Peterson's existing support obligations based on Cameron Peterson's attaining majority in March
1992 and to assess nearly two years of arrearages on the basis of a supposedly "automatic"
modification of Peterson's support obligations of which neither he nor Ball were aware at the
time.4
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need for this court to delve into issues
of policy. For purposes of analytical completeness, however, Peterson offers the following
response to Ball's vigorous assertion that the legislature has expressed an "intent to provide for
the automatic support adjustment without the expense and hassle of a court proceeding."
Appellee's Brief at 14. As desirable as it may be to have support awards that adjust without the
need for court action, the law has and must place a greater value on parties being able to
ascertain their legal obligations. A statute that effects "automatic" changes in support obligations

4

As stated in Upland Industries Corp. V. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 642
(Utah 1984), the parties' pre-litigation conduct is a very persuasive indicator of their
contemporaneous understanding of their rights and obligations. If Ball actually believed that she
was due an additional $200 per month in child support when Cameron Peterson reached age 18,
it was incumbent upon her to give Peterson some notice of this fact rather than seeking
thousands of dollars in arrearages and attorneys' fees two years later. The fact that no such
claim for support was advanced until January 1994 is indicative of the fact that Ball did not
believe, in March 1992, that Peterson owed additional support.
p\59630-1.013.chd
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is of no utility if neither of the parties understand the change to have taken place until years
later. It is difficult to perceive how such a result would reduce the parties' expenses or the
"hassle" involved in determining — at every point in time — the amount of the support obligation
owed.
IV.

The trial court erred in calculating Peterson's child support obligations under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-7J5 by giving Ball credit for medical insurance payments which
she does not, in fact, pay and which are purchased by her current spouse to cover
his children from a previous marriage.

In Peterson's Opening Brief, the evidence on this issue was carefully marshaled to
support the decision and the conclusion was nonetheless inescapable: Ball is receiving credit in
the calculation of the child support obligation for medical insurance premiums that are being
made by her current spouse. [R. at 1213-14]. The insurance is a "family policy" obtained
through the employer of Ball's present spouse which is paid for by deductions from her spouse's
paycheck. [R. at 1219]. The coverage provided by that policy extends to Ball's present spouse,
Ball herself, the children from Ball's spouse's previous marriage and some the parties' children.
Under the district court's ruling, Ball is credited with $100 per month of medial insurance
payments. See [R. at 1004] (attached to Peterson's Opening Brief as Attachment 4). This
determination is clearly erroneous.
Without citing any supporting evidence from the record, Ball disingenuously claims that
"Ball has paid for the insurance she has purchased . . . ."

Appellee's Brief at 15. This

insupportable claim that Ball "pays" for this insurance is rationalized on the next page of Ball's
brief where she concedes that
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It makes no difference how insurance is paid, and/or who signs a check when
funds come from the family budget. If one parent makes a purchase for clothing,
food, or even medical insurance, the child support payments from another spouse
reimbursed the pooled resources of the family. . . . [T]his is how family budgets
operate, and that all child support orders and guidelines are made taking this into
consideration.
Appellee's Brief at 16 (emphasis added). Without taking time to dispute the patently ridiculous
assertion that Ball knows how all family budgets operate, her claim that this is how the child
support guidelines function is -- as a matter of law — simply wrong. Section 78-45-7.4. of the
Utah Code Ann. expressly provides that "Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines." In other words, the "pooled
resources" of Ball and her new husband are irrelevant to the calculation of Peterson's child
support obligation/

If Ball were remarried to a billionaire and his children were living in

palatial luxury with Ball's new spouse, Peterson's child support obligation would remain
unchanged. For purposes of calculating child support, it is only the incomes and expenses of
Peterson and Ball that are relevant.
5

In an apparent attempt to construct a reductio ab absurdum argument, Ball further asserts
that "Plaintiff's Counsel may as well argue that he should see every check written for food
clothing and everything else . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 16. This argument too demonstrates
lack of understanding of Utah's child support laws. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.20
a support payor is entitled to an accounting, including receipts, of amounts expended for the
child's benefit. This is not, however, the point. Medical insurance premiums are different that
amounts spent for food, clothing and other necessities because those items are presumably
covered by the base child support obligation. Medical insurance premiums are added to the base
child support award and have separate specific statutory procedures for determining the proper
amount to be added to the obligor's support obligation. Moreover, Ball's argument pointlessly
focuses on the "non-issue" of which spouse "wrote the checks" for the medical insurance
premiums. See Appellee's Brief at 16. The clear evidence in this case is that no checks were
being written for the medical insurance premiums. These premiums were deducted from Ball's
spouse's paycheck to provide insurance for many more people than the parties' children
p\59630-l 013 chd
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The plain language of Utah's statutes also demonstrates the district court's error. Section
78-45-7.7 of the Utah Code Ann. states that "the children's portion of any monthly payments
made directly by each parent for medical and dental insurance premiums", (emphasis
added)6, should be used in making the child support calculation. The 1994 amendments to the
child support guidelines clarify that "[E]ach parent [is] to share equally the out-of-pocket costs
of the premiums actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of the insurance." Utah
Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(3) (emphasis added). The statutory language is unmistakable. Only
premiums paid by parents are entitled to be considered in calculating child support obligations.
Because the medical insurance payments do not come from Ball's income, they cannot be used
to modify Peterson's support obligation.
A further respect in which the ruling with respect to medical insurance is clearly
erroneous it that it is based on an obvious arithmetic error. Under the district court's decision,
Ball is receiving a credit of $100 per month for medical insurance premiums that she is
"paying." The child support worksheet showing the derivation of this $100 figure, [R. at 1004]
(Attachment 4 to Peterson's Opening Brief), indicates that Ball is getting credit for 4/7 of the
$175.50 premium "paid" by Ball. There is no dispute that only two of the parties' children are
covered by Ball's insurance. Thus, 2/7, which would yield a credit of $50.14—if the amount
were actually paid by Ball. This error, which was identified in Peterson's Opening Brief, is not
controverted or defended by Ball in her brief.

6

The quoted text is the version of the statute in effect prior to the 1994 amendments. It
contains the procedure in effect at the time of the trial in this matter.
p\59630-1.013 chd
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In response to this overwhelming authority, Ball again responds that it is within the
district court's discretion to make its child support calculations on the basis of "a family budget
of pooled resources." Appellee's Brief at 16. This is not correct. The district court does not
have discretion to ignore the clear mandate of a statute which specifically indicates that only
medical premiums actually paid by a parent may be considered. Notwithstanding the broad
discretion given to trial courts in such matters, where the legislature has spoken a district court
cannot ignore its mandate.7
V.

There is no basis for awarding attorneys fees to Ball in this matter.
Amazingly, a mere three pages after Ball claimed that her family "like all families"

functions on "pooled assets," see Appellee's Brief at 16, Ball claims that she is entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees on the basis of "her meager income below the minimum wage level."
Id. at 19. The evidence before the district court was clearly to the contrary.

Defendant's

Exhibit 14, the 1993 Federal Tax Return for Ball and her current spouse indicated gross income
of $73,987. In addition to this amount, Ball received tax-free child support payments from

7

On this issue too, Ball again engages in an ad hominem attack on both Peterson and
Peterson's counsel. Appellee's Brief at 16 ("Peterson and his counsel cannot seriously raise an
issue of an abuse of discretion, except in complete bad faith.") As demonstrated above,
Peterson's position is directly supported by the unequivocal language of controlling Utah statutes
and by uncontroverted citations from the record in this case. It is Ball whose good faith must
seriously be questioned. As noted above, it is dishonest to argue that "Peterson cites nothing
from the record showing who signed all the checks," id., when the record that unequivocally
demonstrates that there were no checks at ail-that these medical insurance premiums were
directly deducted from the paycheck of Ball's spouse. This assertion, in light of the record on
appeal, appears to fall short of the obligations imposed by Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
p\59630-l 013 chd
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Peterson during 1993 of at least $14,503 [R. at 1121]. Thus, the "family" income available to
Ball was nearly $90,000 in 1993. Although Ball's personal income was modest, it is clear that
she voluntarily changed employment to a lower paying job [R. at 1207] and that she anticipated
quitting her employment entirely in order to spend time with her family. [R at 1216]. Peterson
does not begrudge Ball's election not to pursue more lucrative employment given her current
spouse's substantial income. It is patently absurd, however, for a person with a household
income of nearly $90,000 per year to argue that she is impoverished.
The issue of attorneys fees was argued at length before the trial court. [R. at 1222-32].
At that time Ball's counsel acknowledged that the trial court had never, in any of the
proceedings relating to this divorce, awarded her attorneys' fees. [R. at 1222]. Acting on the
basis of all the relevant information, the trial court again denied Ball's request for fees.

[R.

at 1124]. This determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Lvngle v.
Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah App.1992); Nielson v. Nielson. 826 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah
App. 1991). Nothing in Appellee's Brief demonstrates an abuse of that discretion.
It must also be noted that the record is devoid of evidence supporting an award of
attorneys fees. It is undisputed that Ball's counsel is the brother of her present spouse. There
is no evidence in the record indicating that Ball has actually paid any fees whatsoever to her
attorney. No Affidavit of Fees in compliance with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial
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Conduct or any other evidence of fees was offered by Ball in the court below. Accordingly, the
district court acted well within its discretion in denying Ball's request for fees.8
VI.

The trial court erred by failing to make appropriate findings as to an "appropriate
and just" support amount, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12, where the
combined incomes of Peterson and Ball exceeded the highest level specified in the
Child Support Guidelines.

The district court's 1995 Order determined that Peterson's monthly gross income was
$14,583 and that Ball's monthly gross income was $732.00. These figures produce a total well
above the highest level specified in the Utah Uniform Child Support tables.

Under these

circumstances, the trial court is obligated to determine "an appropriate and just" amount of child
support, which "may not be less than the highest level specified in the table for the number of
children due support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. In exercising this discretion, the trial
court must make findings that are specific enough "to ensure that the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based." Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986).
Moreover, "findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, failure to make
adequate findings is an abuse of discretion. Id.; Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

8

Ball also failed to properly raise this issue on appeal. The trial court ruled against Ball on
her request for fees. Ball failed to file a timely notice of appeal on this issue. Instead, she
simply raised the question of fees in her Appellee's Brief. Significantly, in Ball's listing of the
"Issues on Appeal" she failed to identify how this issue was preserved for appeal. See Appellee's
Brief at 4.
p\5963(M 013 chd
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The district court failed to make any findings to support this award. The court's entire
statement on this issue is as follows:
The previous monthly gross income of the Defendant was found to be
$10,500.00. the Court finds that the Defendant's monthly gross income is now
$14,583.00, and that the monthly gross income for the Plaintiff shall be imputed
to be at the minimum wage level.
9.
Based upon the above figures, child support should be awarded to
Plaintiff in the amount of $1,520.00 pursuant to the child support schedules.
[R. at 1120]. In her brief, Ball provides the mathematical equation used by her counsel to
determine the extrapolated "Base Combined Child Support Obligation" which Ball asserts should
be $2399 per month. Appellee's Brief at 17. Ball concedes that the figure is merely a linear
extrapolation based on the ratio of the highest award in the guidelines to the actual combined
income of the parties. Id. There are at least two fundamental problems with this analysis.
First, there is no supporting case law in Utah holding that a "straight line" extrapolation
above the highest award in the guidelines. By statute, the trial court is required to determine
"an appropriate and just" amount of child support, which "may not be less than the highest level
specified in the table for the number of children due support." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that an appropriate and just award flows mathematically
from the guidelines — regardless of the incomes involved. It is easy to envision circumstances
under which child support awards could be ridiculously above any possible need of a child to
be supported.
Although there are no Utah appellate decisions on this issue, the en banc decision of the
Supreme Court of Missouri in Mehra v. Mehra. 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1991) (for the
p\S96S(M 013 chd
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convenience of the Court, a copy of this decision is attached hereto as Attachment "A") is
directly on point. This case involved a child support guideline statute much like Utah's that had
a maximum monthly income figure of $10,000. The trial court awarded child support based
upon a "straight line" extrapolation above the highest amount in Missouri's table. The Missouri
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed this determination. It held:
We interpret the schedule differently. Court-ordered child support, as provided
by statute, is to be an amount "reasonable or necessary " for support of the child
and not to provide an accumulation of capital. . . . The amounts indicated on the
schedule are but a presumption of the proper level of support, given the monthly
income of the parties and we find that the trial court's mode of extrapolation
beyond the confines of the schedule unjustified in the absence of any specific
finding that the $1550 figure is unjust or inappropriate.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
Second, the methodology used by Ball to extrapolate is questionable. Her analysis
assumes that each incremental block of income is subject to the same percentage of child support
obligation. A review of the guidelines, however, quickly demonstrates that this is not correct.
The support guidelines for 3 children require support of $356 per month for income of $1100,
or 32%. For monthly incomes of $10,1000, however, the support obligation is $1808, or 18%.
Thus it is apparent that the incremental child support decreases with higher levels of monthly
income. In light of this gradual decrease in incremental support obligation, Ball's extrapolation
methodology substantially overstates the appropriately extrapolated award. Attached hereto as
Attachment "B" is a handout from the Seminar of the Utah Fellows of the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers Seminar on "Dealing with Special Problems in Divorce," held in Salt
Lake City in December 1994, in which the methodology used by some domestic practitioners
p\59630-l 013 chd
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and commissioners in this state is described. If the parties' base support obligation were
calculated using this "extrapolation by incremental percentage ratio" (i.e. $10 of additional
support for every $100 in monthly income above $10,100 per month) the "Base Combined
Support Obligation" in this case would be $2,128 per month as opposed to $2399 as calculated
by Ball. The discrepancy is substantial.

Over the period of time involved in this case,

thousands of dollars are at issue.
The district court clearly failed to make findings that are "sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue [in setting the support award] was reached." Cf. Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111
(Utah App. 1990). Although, Peterson urged the trial court to consider all the relevant factors
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) in making an award outside that specified by the
guidelines, in the absence of any findings, however, it is not possible to assess what method was
used for determining Peterson's obligation. Even if the district court were to make findings that
an "appropriate and just" award would exceed the highest amount in the guidelines, the
extrapolation performed by Ball improperly overstates Peterson's support obligation. It is
therefore necessary to remand this issue for further consideration by the trial court.

p\59630-1.013.chd

21

VII.

The trial court erred in determining that there had been a material change in
circumstances, warranting a modification of Peterson's child support obligations
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) because, if properly calculated, Peterson's
support obligations under current guidelines do not vary by more than 25% from
the previous support order.

A material change in circumstances warranting modification of a child support award is
defined by statute in Utah to exist present "if there is a difference of at least 25% between the
existing order and the guidelines." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6). Thus, the relevant inquiry
for a district court to make in assessing the existence of a material change in circumstances not
whether there has been an increase in incomes but rather whether the increases in the parties'
incomes would produce a 25% different result in child support obligation. The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law entered by the district court in this case unambiguously demonstrate that
the court focused on the wrong issue:
The Court finds that there has been a material change of circumstances of
at least 25% and a modification of the previous decree is in order . . . The
previous monthly gross income of the Defendant was found to be $10,500. The
Court finds that the Defendant's monthly gross income is now $14,583. and that
the monthly gross income for the Plaintiff shall be imputed at the minimum wage
level.
Based upon the above figures, child support should be awarded to Plaintiff
in the amount of $1520.00 pursuant to the child support schedules.
[R. at 1120] (emphasis added). Clearly the district court focused on the increase in Peterson's
monthly salary and not on whether that increase would modify his support obligation by more
than 25%. See Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that there was
no material change of circumstances even where there was a dramatic change in parties' incomes
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because the existing award was based on another state's guidelines and the new incomes did not
produce a 25 % change under Utah's guidelines.) Under precisely the same reasoning as Brooks,
this matter should be remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether there has
been a 25% change in the level of support previously ordered. In light of the numerous errors
outlined above, Peterson's support obligation will certainly need to be recalculated. When this
obligation is properly recalculated, Peterson believes that it will not vary from the previously
ordered amount by 25 %.
CONCLUSION
The brief filed by Appellee Gayle Ball does not substantially dispute the issues raised by
Peterson on this appeal. Ball has not disagreed with a single point of law or argued that any of
Peterson's "Issues on Appeal" were not properly preserved. On virtually all points, Ball has
simply asserted that the district court had sufficient discretion to support its determinations in
this case. Peterson has properly identified the standards of review applicable to this issues in
this appeal. Many of the alleged errors involve interpretation and application of statutes, which
are not matters within the district court's discretion. Even as to the issues committed to the
discretion of the district court, such discretion must be rationally exercised and supported by
adequate findings. For the reasons stated above, Appellant Peterson hereby requests that this
Court reverse and remand to the district court for further consideration the order modifying
decree of divorce entered herein on January 30, 1995.
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MEHRA v. MEHRA

Mo. 3 5 1

Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991)

Subodh R. MEHRA, DefendantAppellant-CrossRespondent,
Rachna MEHRA, Plaintiff-RespondentCross-Appellant.
No. 73748.
Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
Nov. 19, 1991.
Marriage dissolution decree was entered by the Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Steven Goldman, J., in which child support guidelines were applied to monthly
incomes in excess of $10,000. Husband
and wife appealed. Case was transferred
and the Supreme Court, Rendlen, J., held
that: (1) award of legal custody of children
to wife was not error; (2) trial court erroneously ordered child support in excess of
maximum guidelines amount without specific finding that maximum amount was
unjust or inappropriate; (3) wife's expert
was qualified to testify to value of medical
equipment; (4) accepting wife's valuation
of office condominium was not error, (5)
remand was required to determine income
from apartment building; (6) ordering husband to cause corporation to transfer insurance policy to wife was not error; (7)
awarding attorney fees to wife was not
error; and (8) wife was properly ordered to
sign declaration that she would not claim
children as income tax dependents.

2. Divorce «=»184(4, 7)
Fupreme Court defers to fact finder's
deten linations of credibility, viewing evidence and permissible inferences therefrom
in fight most favorable to dissolution decree, disregarding all contrary evidence
and inferences.
3% Divorce <*=>4
Child custody statute, which was
adopted after petition for dissolution was
filed, did not apply in that proceeding.
V.A.M.S. § 452.375, subd. 3.
4, Divorce <3=>298(1)
Award of legal custody of children to
wife and temporary custody with visitation
rights to husband was not abuse of discretion in marriage dissolution proceeding
where wife had been primary influence in
lives of children and wife's parenting decision often conflicted with those of husband.
V.A.M.S. § 452.375, subd. 2.
5, Divorce <3=>312.7
Allegations that one daughter moved
in to live with husband after trial of marriage dissolution proceeding would be considered as to custody and support on remand of decree which awarded legal custody to wife and temporary custody with
visitation rights to husband. V.A.M.S.
§ 452.375, subd. 2.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Covington, J., concurred in part, concurred in result in part, and filed separate
opinion in which Robertson, CJ., and
Blackmar, J., joined.

6, Divorce <s=>308
Child support award based in dissolution proceeding where parents' gross
monthly income exceeded $10,000 was erroneously calculated using straight line extrapolation from a percent of income for
child support based on $10,000 monthly income where no specific finding was made
that award based on $10,000 scheduled income was unjust or inappropriate. V.A.M.S.
§ 452.340.

1. Divorce <s=»184(6)
Supreme Court must sustain trial
court's decree in dissolution proceeding unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against weight of evidence, or
it erroneously declares or applies law.

7S Parent and Child <3=»3.3(7)
Court-ordered child support, as provided by statute, is to be amount reasonable
or necessary for support of child when
balanced against parents' ability to pay and
family's standard of living. V.A.M.S.
§ 452.340.
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8. Evidence <s»543(4)
Wife's expert witness was qualified to
testify regarding value of equipment used
in medical practice in dissolution proceeding where expert had visited practice to
examine equipment in question, including
x-ray and computer equipment, and was
familiar with secondhand market for medical equipment.
9. Evidence <s»546
Qualifications of witness to render expert opinion lie within trial court's discretion.
10. Evidence <s=>488
Trial court was entitled to accept
wife's valuation of office condominium
when valuing condominium in dissolution
proceeding, even though husband testified
that market value of condominium was
$55,000 less, where wife was joint owner.
11. Divorce <s=>287
Remand of dissolution decree was necessary to determine income from apartment building where record did not provide
substantial evidence to support a finding of
the monthly income from property.
12. Divorce <8=>252.3(4)
Dissolution decree properly ordered
husband, as sole shareholder of medical
corporation, to cause corporation to transfer two insurance policies on husband's life
to wife where husband made no showing
that transfer could not be accomplished;
trial court did not allocate corporate assets
themselves as marital property.
13. Divorce <3=>227(1)
Ordering husband to pay wife $47,190
in attorney fees was not abuse of discretion
in marriage dissolution proceeding; award
was less than bill for legal services.
14. Divorce <3=»223
Award of attorney fees in marriage
dissolution proceeding is within discretion
of trial court.
15. Divorce <s=*308
Ordering wife to execute written declaration that she would not claim children as
income tax dependents was not error, even
though mother was custodial parent.

16. Divorce <3=»286(8)
Supreme Cou^t gives deference to trial
judge when reviewing valuation of property in marriage dissolution proceeding; trial
judge is in best position to assess credibility of witnesses and apply proper values to
property.
17. Evidence <s=»489
Trial court was entitled to disregard
wife's uncontradicted testimony concerning
valuation of her medical practice; refusal
to include $25,000 unsecured debt allegedly
used to purchase equipment for practice
was not error.
18. Divorce <3=>252.2
Trial court is to make just division of
marital property in dissolution proceeding
after consideration of pertinent factors
such as contribution of each spouse to acquisition of marital property, value of property set apart to each spouse, and economic
circumstances of each spouse at time division is to become effective; division need
not be equal. V.A.M.S. § 452.330, subd. 1.
19. Divorce <s»252.2
Division of marital property was just,
even though not exactly equal, where division of assets was roughly equal.
V.A.M.S. § 452.330, subd. 1.
20. Divorce <^252.3(1)
Trial court properly excluded pharmacy corporations repayment of husband's
loan from marital property in dissolution
decree where husband had advanced funds
to corporation and repayment was used to
buy husband's separate home.

Mark S. Corman, Clayton, Christopher
Karlen, St. Louis, Edward K. Fehlig, Clayton, for defendant-appellant-cross-respondent.
Robert F. Summers, Theresa Counts
Burke, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondentcross-appellant.
RENDLEN, Judge.
In this dissolution proceeding, both husband (Subodh K. Mehra) and wife (Rachna

MEHRA v. MEHRA
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991)

Mehra) appeal from the trial court's decree.
The parties were married in India in 1973,
and their two daughters, ^haila, now 16,
and Anjali, now 8, were born in the United
States. The parties are physicians, licensed to practice in Missouri, with a combined monthly income of $19,395.00 at the
time of trial.
[1,2] The trial court appointed the Honorable Franklin Ferriss as Master and accepted his recommended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. We granted
transfer from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, to examine the application of the Missouri child support
guidelines to monthly incomes in excess of
$10,000. Applying the standards of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc
1976), we must sustain the trial court's
decree unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight
of the evidence, or it erroneously declares
or applies the law. Further, we defer to
the factfinder's determinations of credibility, viewing the evidence and permissible
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the decree, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Wynn v.
Wynn, 738 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo.App.1987);
Ware v. Ware, 647 S.W.2d 582, 583-84
(Mo.App.1983).
Child Custody
[3] Husband first contests the trial
court's award of legal custody to the wife
and temporary custody with visitation
rights to him, contending the court should
have awarded joint legal custody pursuant
to § 452.375.3, RSMo Supp.1988. This subsection, added in 1988, reads as follows:
The general assembly finds and declares
that it is the public policy of this state to
assure children frequent and meaningful
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage, and that it is in the public
interest to encourage parents to share
decision-making rights and responsibili1. Husband notes that Shaila, the elder daughter,
moved in with him after trial, and this, of
course, was not in evidence before the trial
court. As we remand the cause for further
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ties of child-rearing. In order to effectuate this policy, the court shall determine
the custody arrangement which will best
assure that parents share such decisionmaking responsibility and authority and
such frequent and meaningful contact
between the child and each parent, as is
indicated in the best interests of the
child under all the relevant circumstances (emphasis supplied).
However, this amendment was not in effect
at the time the petition in this case was
filed on October 26, 1987, and is therefore
inapplicable here. In re Marriage of Ross,
772 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Mo.App.1989).
[4,5] Nonetheless, assuming arguendo
the amendment is applicable, child custody
must be determined in accordance with
"the best interests of child," § 452.375.2,
RSMo Supp.1988, see also § 452.375.2,
RSMo 1986 (containing the same criterion),
and we do not find the trial court's judgment erroneous in this respect The statutes do not limit the discretion of the trial
court to reject joint custody, and the court
found that the wife has been "the primary
influence in both daughters' lives" and that
her parenting decisions often conflict with
those of the husband. In his testimony
husband admitted a difficulty in communicating with his wife regarding the children.
Imperative to the best interests of the child
in a joint custody arrangement are "[t]he
commonality of beliefs concerning parental
decisions and the ability of the parents to
cooperate and function as a parental unit."
Massman v. Massman, 749 S.W.2d 717,
720 (Mo.App.1988). "Unless [parental]
guidance has some uniformity it may well
be worse than no guidance at all." Lipe v.
Lipe, 743 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Mo.App.1988).
This first point is denied.1
Child Support
[6] We find merit, however, in husband's challenge to the trial court's child
support award. The court based its award
on the Missouri Child Support Guideline
Schedule of Basic Child Support Obliproceedings, the trial court should review such
allegations, and if true, determine the proper
course as to custody and support in accordance
with the directions given in this opinion.
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gations as applied by the Circuit Court of
St. Louis County. This schedule, based on
the Income Shares M odel developed by the
National Center for State Courts, was prepared by the Missouri Child Support Guidelines Task Force, funded by the Missouri
Bar Association Family Law Section and
the Missouri Department of Social Services, and was first published at 735-736
S.W.2d Missouri Cases, p. XL, in 1987.
Pursuant to the direction of the legislature,
§ 452.340.7, RSMo Supp.1989, the schedule
has since been adopted as Form 14 of our
Rules, coincident with Rule 88.01, on October 2, 1989, and made mandatory as of
April 1, 1990. The schedule sets forth the
amount of child support as a proportion of
the combined gross monthly income of the
parents. At $100 monthly income, the basic child support for two children is thirtyseven percent of income, and though with
each $100 increase in monthly income, the
amount of child support increases, the percentage ratio of ' 'support-to-income" decreases steadily to 15.5 percent when it
reaches $8400. For monthly incomes from
$8400 through $10,000 the support percentage is 15.5 percent, and the schedule ends
at the $10,000 monthly income level with
$1,550 in child support for two children.2
This case presents the important question
of interpreting these guidelines when the
parties have a monthly income in excess of
$10,000.
[7] The trial court, finding the parties'
combined gross monthly income to be $19,395, made a straight line extrapolation of
the 15.5 percent ratio and calculated the
children's support at $3000 per month ($19,935 x .155 = $3,006.23), with husband to
2. The pattern of gradual steady reduction of
child support as a percentage of monthly income is as follows:
Monthly Income
% for Child Support
$100
$1000
$2000
$3000
$4000
$5000
$6000
$7000
$8000
$9000
$10,000

37.0%
30.5%
24.7%
22.7%
21.0%
19.2%
18.0%
16.8%
15.8%
15.5%
15.5%

pay 65.6 percent of this amount and wife t j
pay the remainder. We interpret the
schedule differently. Court-ordered child
support, as provided by statute, is to be an
amount "reasonable or necessary" for support of the child, § 452.340, RSMo 19C6,
"and not to provide an accumulation of
capital." Heins v. Heins, 783 S.W.2d 481,
483 (Mo.App.1990), which must be balanced
against the parents' ability to pay and the
family's standard of living. See Wynn v.
Wynn, 738 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Mo.App.1987);
Wiesbusch v. Deke, 762 S.W.2d 521, 523
(Mo.App.1988) Reed v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d
326, 330 (Mo.App.1989); Pursifull v. Pursifull, 781 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Mo.App.1989);
In re Marriage of Cope, 805 S.W.2d 303,
308 (Mo.App.1991); § 452.340(3), (4), and
(6), RSMo 1986. Further statutory factors
for consideration are "[t]he father's primary responsibility for support of his
child," § 452.340(1), "[t]he financial resources of the child," § 452.340(2), and
"[t]he physical and emotional condition of
the child, and his educational needs." Section 452.340(5). The amounts indicated on
the schedule are but a presumption of the
proper level of support, given the monthly
income of the parties, and we find the trial
court's mode of extrapolation beyond the
confines of the schedule unjustified in the
absence of any specific finding that the
$1550 figure is unjust or inappropriate.
Further, the record does not reflect how
the court determined husband must pay
$800 per month towards the children's
"special needs," which include private educational expenses of $1,133.33 per month.
Accordingly, we remand the cause for fur-

Change in % for Support

6.5
5.8
2.0
1.7
1.8
1.2
U
1.0
0.0
0.0

MEHRA v. MEHRA
Cite as 819 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.banc 1991)

ler proceedings consistent with this opin>n.3
Valuation of Southside Medical Group,
P.C. and Office Condominium
The parties founded Southside Medical
Jroup, P.C, their medical practice, in 1981,
nd leased to the corporation an office conlominium on Mackenzie Road. At the time
if trial, husband held 90 shares of stock in
Jouthside and wife held 10. Husband was
iwarded the condominium and all shares in
Southside, but he complains the court erred
n overvaluing the property thus awarded
o him.
[8,9] Gerald Magruder, the wife's expert, testified regarding the value of the
Southside medical practice, and the husoand contends Magruder was incompetent
to testify as to the value of the equipment.
This contention is not well taken. Magruder testified he had visited Southside to
examine the equipment in question and was
familiar with the secondhand market for
medical equipment, having valued used
equipment in connection with the sale of
medical practices. The qualifications of a
witness to render an expert opinion lie
within the trial court's discretion, Tkarp v.
Oberhellman, 527 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo.
App.1975), and we find no abuse of discretion on the record here. Further, we do
not find that the court's valuation of X-ray
and computer equipment leased to the corporation by husband, based on Magruder's
testimony is against the weight of the evidence or unsupported by substantial evidence.
3. Though our Rule 88.01 and Form 14 were not
effective at the time the circuit court entered
judgment on July 1, 1989, see Mueller v. Mueller,
782 S.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Mo.App.1990) (Rule
88.01 and § 452.340.7, RSMo Supp.1989, not
retroactive), its decision was based on the same
schedule and we find the principles enunciated
above applicable in construing our Rule and the
accompanying form. Rule 88.01 states that
"[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that the
amount of child support calculated pursuant to
Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is the amount of
child support to be awarded," and "[i]t is sufficient m a particular case to rebut the presumption that the amount of child support calculated

mo. 3DD

[10] In valuing the Mackenzie Condominium, the trial court apparently accepted
the $?S0,000 valuation, including "leasehold
impro\ ements," given in wife's First
Amended Statement of Property, leaving a
net equity of $28,000 in light of the $152,000 mortgage on the property. Husband
contests this valuation, arguing the market
value of the property is $125,000 with balance of $154,000 due on the mortgage,
leaving no market value at all. Husband
and wife, as owners of the property, were
both competent to testify as to its value,
Schulze v. C & H Builders, 761 S.W.2d
219, 223 (Mo.App.1988), and we are obliged
to defer to the factfinder's determination
of credibility, Wynn v. Wynn, 738 S.W.2d
at 918, which weighed in favor of the wife.
Husband finally complains leasehold improvements were improperly counted in valuing both the condominium and the medical practice. The trial court awarded husband the condominium, "together with all
leasehold improvements thereto," and set
its fair market value at $180,000. In valuing the assets held by the medical practice,
the court included $28,000 in "equipment
and leasehold improvements," based on a
balance sheet prepared by Magruder. A
footnote to Magruder's "equipment and
leasehold" figure, however, indicates that it
does not include the condominium, and the
following page of Magruder's report demonstrates that the full amount listed as
"equipment and leasehold" was actually
the value of equipment alone, thus the addition of the term "leasehold" appears to
have been inadvertent both on Magruder's
balance sheet and in the trial court's findpursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is
correct if the court or administrative agency
enters in the case a written finding or a specific
finding on the record that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors,
is unjust or inappropriate." Further, the concurring opinion of Covington, J., cites the statutory factors of § 452.340, RSMo Supp.1990.
Section 452.340 was amended in respect to these
factors in 1988, and that amendment is not
applicable to this case, in which the petition was
filed October 26, 1987. In re Marriage of Ross,
772 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Mo.App.1989).
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ings. This did not result, however, in any
improper valuation of the assets, as husband would have us believe, thus this point
is denied.
Tucker Property
[11] The parties were partners with another couple in the 1812 Tucker Partnership, whose sole asset is a four-unit apartment building at 1812-1814 Tucker, owned
and operated by the partnership. The trial
court awarded the Mehra's partnership interest to husband, attributing to it a net
monthly income of $205, but husband contends the operating expenses exceed the
rental on the building, resulting in a net
monthly loss of $542, thus the venture cannot possibly be income-producing. Wife
counters that husband may claim a $6,231
tax benefit in depreciation on the property.
The trial court apparently derived the
$205 income figure from the partnership
balance sheet designating "owner withdrawals" of $3700 for the first nine months
of 1988, which, divided by the couple's onehalf interest in the partnership, results in a
monthly quotient of $205.55. The balance
sheet, however, does not account for the
mortgage payments, though evidence of
such payments was presented at trial.
The trial court apparently disbelieved
husband's testimony and it is the exclusive
province of that court to weigh the evidence. Cole v. Plummer, 661 S.W.2d 828
(Mo.App.1983). Because we are unable to
determine from the record whether its
judgment in this respect is supported by
substantial evidence, we direct the court on
remand to further examine this issue.

The trial court's action in classifying the
corporate assets as marital property, and
dividing them between the parties, was
reversible error. A marital dissolution
decree may not purport to affect property of a corporation that is not a party to
the litigation, even if the corporate stock
is primarily or entirely owned by one of
the parties to the dissolution action. The
trial court was limited to a disposition of
the stock of the corporation which was
admitted by both parties to be marital
property. The trial court has no jurisdiction to enter a decree dividing property
that is not owned by either spouse. (Citations omitted.)
See also Penn v. Pennt 655 S.W.2d 631
(Mo.App.1983); In re Marriage of Schulz,
583 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Mo.App.1979); V.M. v.
L.M., 526 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo.App.1975).
These cases may be distinguished, however, on the basis that here the trial court
did not allocate the corporate assets themselves as marital property, but directed
husband, as sole shareholder under the
court's decree, to cause the corporation to
transfer the two insurance policies on his
life to Rachna Mehra.4 Husband makes no
showing this cannot be accomplished, and
we conclude the trial court did not misapply
the law in this regard. Murphy v. Carronf
536 S.W.2d at 32.
Attorney's Fees

Insurance Policies
[12] Husband next charges error in the
trial court's order to husband "as sole
shareholder of [Southside Medical Group,
P.C. to] cause [the] corporation to transfer"
two insurance policies on his life to Rachna
Mehra. Husband relies on cases such as
In re Marriage of Ward, 659 S.W.2d 605,
607 (Mo.App.1983), where the court held:

[13,14] Husband finally contends the
court erred in ordering him to pay wife
$47,190 in attorney's fees ($42,558 to Schecter & Watkins, P.C. and $4,632 to Ebert,
Meness & Kriegel), and further argues the
court impermissibly awarded fees for
wife's expert witnesses. The bill submitted by Schecter. & Watkins was $58,785.65, including $7503.50 in fees for the
expert witnesses. The court's award for
Schecter & Watkins, "as and for their attorney's fees and expenses incurred in respect of this matter," is less than the bill
for legal services alone and does not by its
terms include fees for the expert witness-

4. Compare Secor v. Secor, 790 S.W.2d 500, 502503 (Mo.App.1990), where the parties agreed
that property held by corporation of which hus-

band was sole shareholder were marital assets
and court treated the corporation as an alter ego
of the parties.
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thus we find husband's argument meritless. Further, an award of attorney's fees
IS within the discretion of the trial court,
Caruthers v. Caruthers, 679 S.W.2d 358,
,}60 (Mo.App.1984), and we find no abuse of
discretion from this record.
Income Tax Dependents

[15] The trial court granted husband
the right to claim the children as dependents for federal and state income tax purposes and ordered wife to execute a written
declaration that she will not claim the children as dependents. Wife argues the court
had no authority to order her to execute
the form, but such an argument was specif-cally rejected in Vohsen v. Vohsen, 801
S.W~2d 789, 791-92 (Mo.App.1991), following the view expressed by a majority of
jurisdictions that have spoken to the subject. Annotation, Allocation of Dependency Exemption, 11 A.L.R.4 786, 791 (1990).
Vohsen noted the 1984 amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code which provided the
custodial parent is generally entitled to the
income tax exemption for dependent children unless the custodial parent signs a
written declaration not to claim the children as dependents and the declaration is
attached to the noncustodial parent's tax
return. The court noted the amendment
"was made to eliminate the need for the
Internal Revenue Service to resolve conflicts when both parents claimed a child as
a dependent," and "when the parent cannot
agree on who is to receive the exemption, it
will be appropriate for our trial courts to
determine this issue." 801 S.W.2d at 79192. The court further observed that under
the Internal Revenue Code, it is insufficient
for the trial court simply to rule that the
noncustodial parent take the exemption,
and "to effectuate such an allocation, a
trial court must order the custodial parent
to annually sign the prescribed declaration,
presently IRS Form 8332." Id. at 792. In
accord with the majority view and persuaded by the rationale and ruling of Vohsen, we hold the trial court did not err in
ordering wife to execute the waiver form.

Property

Valuation

[16] Following the parties' separation
but prior to dissolution of their marriage,
they sold their marital abode and divided
the proceeds, each purchasing a new residence. Wife argues the trial court overvalued the furnishings in husband's home
and undervalued the furnishings in her
home. Giving deference to the trial judge,
who is in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and apply proper
values to the property, and we hold his
valuations are supported by substantial evidence and not against the weight of the
evidence. Siegentkaler v. Siegenthaler,
761 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Mo.App.1988).
[17] Wife next contends the court erred
in undervaluing her medical practice. In
calculating the value, the court explicitly
refused to include a $25,000 unsecured debt
to Boatmen's Bank, finding the loan was
not required to be used in wife's medical
practice. Wife argues her uncontradicted
testimony shows the funds bought equipment needed for the practice. The trial
court, however, was entitled to disregard
even
uncontradicted
testimony,
Intertherm, Inc. v. Coronet Imperial
Corp., 558 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo.App.1977),
and we do not find its conclusion against
the weight of the evidence.
Division of Marital

Property

[18,19] Wife claims the division of marital property "should have been fairly close
to equal" because there was no marital
misconduct to justify unequal distribution.
The court is to make a just division of
property after consideration of pertinent
factors such as the contribution of each
spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, the value of the property set
apart to each spouse, and the economic
circumstances of each spouse at the time
the division of property is to become effective, § 452.330.1, RSMo 1986, but a "just"
division need not be equal. Siegenthaler,
761 S.W.2d at 266; Ware v. Ware, 647
S.W.2d at 584. Regardless, adding to
wife's calculations the equity in the parties'
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homes, as well as the jewelry set apart to
her under the court's decree, the division of
assets is roughly equal, thus we find the
point without merit.
Loan to Anjusha

Corporation

[20] Finally, wife claims the court erred
in failing to distribute as marital property
$20,000 in loans repaid to husband from
Anjusha Enterprises Limited, a corporation
formed by the parties to obtain a franchise
from Medicine Shoppe International and operate a pharmacy under that name. The
parties were initially the sole shareholders
of Anjusha, and the pharmacist managing
the operation later obtained some shares.
The couple advanced approximately $10,000
to Anjusha at its formation in September
1986, and husband testified that during the
next two years following he lent approximately $43,000 in addition. Anjusha later
obtained a loan of $93,000 from Boatmen's
Bank, and husband received $20,000 from
this amount as repayment for monies earlier advanced to the corporation, using the
funds toward the down payment on his
home. Wife contends the $43,000 was lent
to the corporation from marital funds and
that the $20,000 repayment, of which she
was unaware until the time of trial, should
have been distributed by the court as a
marital asset. The trial court found, however, that husband had advanced the funds
to the corporation and the repayment was
not "squandered or secreted" by him. We
cannot say this finding is unsupported by
substantial evidence or is against the
weight of the evidence.
We affirm the trial court's decree in all
respects except its child support award and
its attribution of a $205 net monthly income to the Tucker property, which we
reverse. The cause is remanded for further proceedings to consider these matters
and the situation as to the custody of Shaila in a manner consistent with this opinion.
HOLSTEIN and BENTON, JJ., and
HIGGINS, Senior Judge, concur.

COVINGTON, J., concurs in part and
concurs in result in part in separate opinion
filed.
ROBERTSON, CJ., and BLACKMAR, J.,
concur in part and concur in result in part
in opinion concurring in part and
concurring in result in part of
COVINGTON, J.
THOMAS, J., not participating because
not a member of the Court when case was
submitted.
COVINGTON, Judge, concurring in part
and concurring in result in part.
I concur with the principal opinion with
the exception of the issue of child support;
on that issue I can concur only in result.
With respect, I disagree with the principal
opinion that the problem presented is one
of "an interpretation of the schedule."
The schedule is silent when the family income exceeds $10,000, thus does not apply.
Furthermore, I fear that the effect of the
language of the principal opinion may
serve to deter trial courts from entering
appropriate awards in excess of the scheduled amount.
The amount of support scheduled to be
awarded upon a $10,000 monthly income is
not a presumed ceiling beyond which any
award is suspect in that it might "provide
an accumulation of capital;" If applicable,
the schedule serves only as a presumed
minimum in this case. Since the schedule
does not apply when the family income
exceeds $10,000 per month, the trial court
should then be guided by the considerations set forth in § 452.340, RSMo Supp.
1990. The relevant factors include:
(1) The financial needs and resources of
the child;
(2) The financial resources and needs of
the parents;
(3) The standard of living the child would
have enjoyed had the marriage not been
dissolved;
(4) The physical and emotional condition
of the child, and his educational needs.
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2. Evidence <3=>448
Parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evidence, unless integrated contract is ambiguous.
3. Guaranty *»92(1)
Determination as to whether guaranty
is ambiguous is question of law to be decided by court.

ROYAL BANKS OF MISSOURI, f/k/a
Royal Bank of Mid-County, and f/k/a
Citizens Bank of University City, Appellant,
v.
Harold L. FRIDKIN, Respondent.
No. 73793.
Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
Nov. 19, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1991.

Lender brought action under $10,000
guaranty of $50,000 note made by gubernatorial campaign committee. The Circuit
Court, Jackson County, Vincent E. Baker,
J., granted judgment for guarantor, and
lender appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed and remanded, and lender appealed. The Supreme Court, Benton, J., held
that: (1) $10,000 guaranty had latent ambiguity to extent it purported to guaranty
$10,000 note, justifying consideration of external matters; (2) circumstances surrounding execution of guaranty and note demonstrated guarantor's intent to be obligated
to pay $10,000 of note; and (3) failure of
committee's treasurer to execute note did
not render it invalid.
Reversed and remanded with direction.

1. Guaranty <3=»27
Rules of construction applicable to
guaranty are same as applied to other contracts.
1. As the principal opinion notes, the statutory
factors applicable in the present case were those

4. Contracts <3=»143(2)
"Latent ambiguity" arises where writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but some collateral matter makes
meaning uncertain.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

5. Contracts <3^147(1)
Cardinal principle is to determine intent of parties when latent or patent ambiguity exists in writing.
6. Contracts e=»147(l, 2), 170(1)
In order to determine intent of parties,
court will consider entire contract, subsidiary agreements, relationship of parties,
subject matter of contract, fact and circumstances surrounding execution of contract,
practical construction parties themselves
have placed on contract by their acts and
deeds, and other external circumstances
that cast light on intent of parties.
7. Evidence ®=*452
Latent ambiguity in writing must be
developed by extrinsic evidence.
8. Evidence <3=>452
Evidence of note that fit description in
guaranty in all respects except for principal
amount, coupled with fact that note in
amount stated in guaranty did not exist,
created latent ambiguity that necessitated
consideration of external matters to determine true intent of parties regarding
whether guaranty pertained to note.
9. Guaranty <3=>40
Circumstances surrounding execution
of $10,000 guaranty and $50,000 note demonstrated agreement designed to limit
in effect in 1987.

ATTACHMENT "B"
TO REPLY BRIEF
(Excerpt from "Dealing with Special Problems in Divorce")
p\59630-I.013.chd

Attached is the case of Mehra v. Mehra (Supreme Court of Missouri,
November 19, 1991), which held, in a statutory scheme similar to the Utah
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, with the highest level being $10,000 gross
income per month, that it was improper for the Court to make a "straight line
extrapolation" and the focus should be to determine the amount "reasonable
or necessary for the support of the child." This case has been interpreted by
some of the Court Commissioners and Judges in Utah to indicate that if the
Utah Legislature had intended a straight line extrapolation under the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines, they would have provided for such.
Some Judges may make a straight line extrapolation, but there is no
consensus among the judiciary as to how that extrapolation should be made.
In the Mehra opinion, the Court attempted to make an extrapolation by a
percentage ratio.
One way to extrapolate beyond the Guidelines by a percentage ratio is as
follows:
Take column for number of children.
What is the dollar increase in support for each $100.00
increment.
Calculate the amount of the income in excess of the top of the
table.
Divide by 100.
Multiply result by support increment per $100.
Example: If the combined gross income is $13,500.00 for two children, the
support increment is $8.00 per $100.
Take the combined gross income of $13,500.00, less the highest amount on
the chart ($13,500 less $10,100.00) = $3,400.00. $3,400.00 + 100 = 34
increments. Multiply 34 increments by $8.00 per 100 increment = $272.00 +
the highest level on the chart of $1,672.00. This is the total gross monthly
income for support purposes.
There is no consensus as to how the Judges and Commissioners are handling
this issue and it would really be determined on a case-by-case basis and the
preference of the particular Commissioner or Judge assigned to the case.

